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"SACRIFICING THE END TO THE MEANS":t




The New York City subway system began transporting passengers in 1904.'
Today the system operates 24 hours a day, carrying on average 4.9 million daily
passengers across 26 subway routes to 468 stations.2 Undoubtedly, the subway is
an integral component of New York City's culture and history, and an engine of its
enormous economy.
It is also inherently difficult to secure. The subway transports a high volume of
passengers in an enclosed space, has numerous access points, and does not require
advance ticket purchase or passenger identification.3 In light of these vulnerabilities
and because of its cultural and economic importance, it is patent that New York City's
subway is a prime terrorist target. In fact, police have already thwarted several plots
to plant explosives in the subway system.4
t "'To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law would be to lose the
law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means."' PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURIrY:
WINNING WITHOUT WAR, at xi (2003) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B.
Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810)).
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2007. She would like to thank Kevin Martin,
whose unfailing patience and support made this Note possible.
MTA New York City Transit-Subways, http://www.mta.info/nyct/facts/ffsubway.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007) [hereinafter MTA Info].
2 Id.; see also NYC & Company, Getting Around NYC By Subway, http://www.nycvisit
.com/content/index.cfm?pagePkey=530 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). Every year, the New York
City subway system transports more than 1.4 billion passengers over 352,784,000 miles.
MTA Info, supra note 1.
3 BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, PROTECTING PUBLIC SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AGAINST
TERRORISM AND SERIOUS CRIME: AN ExEcuTVE OvERvIEw 1 (2001). Approximately one-
third of terrorist attacks worldwide occur on transportation systems, and public transit is the
mode most commonly targeted. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRANSPORTATION ISSUES IN THE
107TH CONGRESS 5-6 (2002).
' In 1997, police uncovered a plot to bomb the Atlantic Avenue subway station in
Brooklyn. Dan Barry, Police Break up Suspected Bomb Plot in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 1997, at Al. In 2004, police discovered a plot to bomb the Herald Square subway station
in midtown Manhattan. Michael R. Bloomberg, Searches Might Save Lives, USA TODAY,
Aug. 3,2005, at A10. And in 2005, federal authorities notified city officials of a plot to plant
explosives in the subway using strollers, briefcases, and packages. William K. Rashbaum,
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Thus far, New York City has protected its transit system from attack. Other cities,
however, have not been so fortunate. In March 1995, religious extremists attacked
the Tokyo subway system with nerve gas, killing 12 people and injuring 6,000.' In
2004, terrorists detonated bombs aboard commuter trains in Moscow and Madrid,
claiming approximately 230 lives and wounding more than 1,500.6 On July 7, 2005,
bombs exploded on three subway trains and on a double-decker bus in London, kill-
ing 52 people and injuring more than 700. 7 Two weeks later, a second series of four
attempted detonations led to a partial evacuation of the London Underground. 8 In that
attack, the bombs' detonators failed to ignite the explosives and no one was injured.9
Most recently, in July 2006, terrorists detonated bombs aboard seven commuter trains
in Mumbai, killing more than 200 people and wounding at least 800.0
After terrorists attempted a second attack on London's subway system, New York
City Mayor Michael E. Bloomberg authorized the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) to begin random searches of backpacks and packages brought into the New
York City transit system."1 Shortly after being implemented, the NYPD announced
that it would enforce the container inspection program indefinitely.
1 2
New York Named in Terror Threat Against Subways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at Al.
Although the intelligence community swiftly determined that this last threat was of "doubtful
credibility," "[s]ecurity in and around New York City's subways was sharply increased" for
several days. Id.
' Mass Transit Security After the London Bombings: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on
Public Safety and Homeland Security, 184th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 2 (Mass. 2005) (statement
of Daniel B. Prieto, Research Director, Homeland Security Partnership Initiative).
6 See id.; Jill Dougherty, Moscow Metro Blast Kills 39, CNN.coM, Feb. 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/02/06/moscow.blast.
' Kevin Cullen & Charles M. Sennott, Police Suspect Bombings Suicide Attacks by
Britons Would Be First of Kind in W. Europe, BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2005, at Al. Though
suicide bombings have long been a popular tactic of Palestinian terrorists in Israel, the Lon-
don subway attacks marked the migration of this tactic to Western Europe. Id. Responsibility
for the London attack was claimed separately by the Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in
Europe and later the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, who also claimed responsibility for the
2004 attacks in Madrid. Evan Thomas & Stryker McGuire, Terror at Rush Hour, NEWS-
WEEK, July 18, 2005, at 24.
8 Alan Cowell, Bombs Set at 4 London Sites, but Fail to Explode, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2005, at Al.
9 Id.
10 Amelia Gentleman, Suspects Are Arrested in India Commuter Rail Bombings, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2006, at A3. Police suspect an Islamic militant group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, helped
plan the attacks. Id.
" Patrick McGeehan, How High, Mr. Bloomberg?, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at NJ5. The
New Jersey Transit and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey instituted similar policies
within twenty-four hours of the mayor's announcement. Id.
12 Complaint at 1, MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
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At security checkpoints in New York subways, police use a numerical formula
to determine the frequency of passengers subject to inspection, such as one in every
five to ten passengers carrying a bag. 13 Selected passengers are asked to open their
bags and manipulate the contents for a visual inspection before they go through the
turnstiles. 4 Those that do not consent to the inspection are not permitted to enter the
transit system, but are allowed to leave without further questioning. 5
Police may not search "wallets, purses or other containers that are too small" to
hold explosives. 16 They also may not intentionally look for other contraband, read
any written material, or request a passenger's personal information. 7 Inspections
are typically accomplished in a matter of seconds. 8
The public is notified of checkpoints by prominently displayed posters and an-
nouncements made at stations and on subway trains.' 9 Inspections take place daily,
but given "available resources and the scope of the subway system, not all stations
have inspections every day."2 ° To enhance the program's deterrent effect, the NYPD
does not publicly disclose the number and location of stations where inspections occur
each day, or the numerical frequency of inspections.2'
" Sewell Chan& Kareem Fahim, New York Starts to Inspect Bags on the Subways, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22,2005, at Al. The NYPD maintains that this "systemized approach" ensures that
passengers are not selected on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion. Id. Rather, the numerical
formula they employ is "based upon such factors as the volume of passengers at the station,
the police personnel available to perform inspections, and the flow of commuter traffic into the
station." Macwade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *5.
" Chan & Fahim, supra note 13. Inspections are conducted in open view at a folding table
near the turnstiles to avoid the appearance of singling out a selected passenger. Macwade,
2005 WL 3338573, at *7.
'" Chan & Fahim, supra note 13.
16 Macwade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *6.
17 Id.
18 Id.
"9 Id. at *7. A 20 -inch by 30-inch poster was displayed near the security checkpoint,
reading "NYPD/BACKPACKS AND OTHER CONTAINERS SUBJECT TO INSPECTION."
Id. Announcements at stations and on subway trains informed passengers "that effective July
22, 2005, their backpacks and other large containers [were] subject to random search by
police." Id.
20 Id. Although the subway system consists of 468 stations, the Transit Bureau of the Police
Department only employs 2,200 officers and 500 supervisors. Chan & Fahim, supra note 13.
21 MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *5. At a pre-trial hearing, the court granted the city's
request for a protective order to shield from discovery documents and information relating
to the frequency and location of searches, finding that the efficacy of the program's deterrent
effect could be seriously undermined by disclosure. MacWade v. Kelly, 230 F.R.D. 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). At the close of trial, plaintiffs renewed their request that information
concerning the frequency of searches be admitted into the record. MacWade, 2005 WL
3338573, at *3. After reviewing the information in camera, the District Court "admitted into
the record under seal and for opposing counsel's 'eyes only,' the data compiled by [the city]
as to the number and location of subway inspection checkpoints conducted between July 22
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On August 4, 2005, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) filed a lawsuit
against the City of New York and the Commissioner of the NYPD contending that
suspicionless searches of subway riders violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.22 The NYCLU filed the lawsuit on behaff of five subway passengers, includ-
ing the son of a retired police captain and a naturalized American citizen.23 The
plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief.24
In December 2005, after a two-day bench trial, U.S. District Court Judge Richard
M. Berman found the container inspection program constitutional and dismissed the
NYCLU's complaint with prejudice. 25 In August 2006, a three-judge panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that New York City's program
satisfies the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's usual requirement
of individualized suspicion.26
This Note supports the result reached by both the District Court and the Second
Circuit. To provide context, Part I briefly reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, in particular the consent and special needs doctrines. Part
II offers an overview of recent cases in which the government defended suspicionless
searches by invoking the threat of terrorism. Part 1II critically examines the opinions
of the District Court and the Second Circuit in MacWade v. Kelly. Part IV expands
on their decisions by suggesting that the legal framework used to analyze suspicionless
security searches should not vary by the mode of transportation. Finally, this Note con-
cludes by considering the future of transit security and addressing concerns that the
threat of terrorism increasingly will be used to justify encroachments on civil liberties.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and requires that search and arrest warrants be supported by probable
cause.27 These protections are not absolute; rather, they are limited by the text of the
Constitution and by specific exceptions articulated by the Supreme Court.
and November 6, 2005." Id. The court concluded that the checkpoint data was neither "nec-
essary or probative." Id. at *15.
22 Complaint, supra note 12, at 5.
23 Id. at 2, 4, 5. Plaintiff Brendan MacWade testified, "While my bag was searched, I felt
violated. I felt that the police did not need to be conducting searches, which I found intrusive."
MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *8 (citation omitted). Plaintiff Joseph Gehring testified, "I
now find myself extremely anxious when I see police officers in the New York City subway
system... because I fear that I will be stopped and searched by the police although I have done
nothing wrong." Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs Gehring and Murphy were selected to be
searched, but refused consent and left the subway. Id.
24 Complaint, supra note 12, at 5-6.
25 MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *20.
26 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. .. ").
1288 [Vol. 15:1285
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The Fourth Amendment applies to "unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 28
Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment search only takes place when an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy is violated.29 Furthermore, an individual is only
"seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if"a reasonable person would
[not] feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter., 30
If the Fourth Amendment is implicated, a search or seizure is ordinarily unconstitu-
tional in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.3' In exceptional cir-
cumstances, however, the Court has sanctioned suspicionless searches and seizures.
A. The Consent Exception
It is well established that police may approach individuals without reasonable
suspicion on the street or in other public places.32 While most individuals respond to
police requests, they need not answer any questions and may not be detained for re-
fusing to cooperate.33 As a result, police may conduct a suspicionless search or seizure
of any person who voluntarily relinquishes his or her Fourth Amendment rights.34
Police are not required to inform individuals of their right to refuse consent.35 More-
over, consent need not be express; it may be implied by a person's actions, such as
silently handing a bag to a security screener.36
B. The Special Needs Exception
The Supreme Court has also upheld suspicionless searches and seizures where
they were designed to serve "special needs beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement., 37 Preferring to develop the special needs doctrine on a case-by-case
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see also id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining that a search takes place when a person exhibits a subjective expec-
tation of privacy and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable).
30 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,436 (1991) (emphasis added). Circumstances affect-
ing whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' request include whether
officers displayed any weapons; whether they conveyed any type of threat; whether they
suggested in any way that compliance was required; whether they advised the individual of
his right to refuse cooperation; as well as the location of the encounter. Id. at 432, 437.
31 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
32 Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 497 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980).
13 Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 556; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring)).
34 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,248-49 (1973) ("Voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.").
31 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
36 United States v. Miner, 484 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973).
3' New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (coining the
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basis,38 the Court has expressly allowed the use of police checkpoints to intercept
illegal immigrants, 39 combat drunk driving,' and obtain information about fatal hit-
and-run accidents.4 Alternatively, the Court has invalidated checkpoints when police
exercised "unconstrained discretion"4 2 or when the primary purpose of a stop was crime
detection.4 3 To determine whether a special needs search is reasonable, the Court bal-
ances "the gravity of the public concern[]," "the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."'
II. THE CONVENTION CASES
Prior to MacWade v. Kelly,4 federal courts had begun to grapple with suspicion-
less search programs initiated after the September 1 lth terrorist attacks.46 In particular,
term "special needs"); see, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65
(1995) (upholding the random drug testing of student athletes); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (upholding drug tests for U.S. Customs Service
employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,633-34 (1989) (upholding drug and alcohol tests for railway
employees involved in train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety regu-
lations); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,702-04 (1987) (allowing the warrantless admin-
istrative inspection of premises of "closely regulated businesses"); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 507-09 (1978) (allowing the administrative inspection of fire-damaged premises
to determine the cause of the blaze); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523,534-39 (1967)
(allowing an administrative inspection to ensure compliance with city housing code).
38 Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39.
3 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
40 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
41 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
42 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
13 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000). The Court made clear, how-
ever, that its decision in Edmond did not affect searches at places like airports and government
buildings, "where the need for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute."
Id. at 47-48.
4 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-55 (balancing
these factors in determining the reasonableness of a checkpoint stop).
45 No. 05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding random
selection of airline passengers for additional screening procedures); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387
F.3d 1303 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (finding blanket searches of demonstrators unconstitutional); United
States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding inspections on highways inside
military installations), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 966 (2002); Cassidy v. Ridge, No. 1:04CV258,
slip op. at 8 (D. Vt. Feb. 16, 2005) (upholding random inspections on ferries), affid sub nom.
Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345, at *2-3 (D.
Mass. July 28, 2004) (permitting random searches on subways and buses); Stauber v. City
of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,2004) (finding
blanket searches of demonstrators unconstitutional), amendedby 2004 WL 1663600 (S.D.N.Y.
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two cases decided in anticipation of the 2004 Democratic and Republican National
Conventions represent the divergent approaches emerging between jurisdictions.
In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Massachusetts Bay Trans-
portation Authority,47 a Massachusetts district court allowed police to search the
bags of all subway and bus riders passing by the Fleet Center in Boston during the
Democratic Convention. 48 The court found the intrusion on individual privacy jus-
tified given the nature of the public interest in security.49 In particular, it cited three
factors that mitigated the intrusion. First, riders were notified that they would be sub-
ject to a search.5 ° Second, the search program was limited in scope and duration.5'
Only riders that passed through the designated security zone were searched, and the
program was limited to the four days of the Convention.52 Finally, the program curbed
the discretion of police by subjecting all riders to searches.53
Conversely, in Stauber v. City of New York,5 a New York district court enjoined
police from conducting blanket searches of demonstrators at the Republican Conven-
tion.5 It ruled that bag searches are not minimally intrusive56 because demonstrators
have an increased expectation of privacy in a bag kept on their person." The court
was primarily concerned that the city's evidence of a threat to public safety was overly
vague and that there was no evidence to suggest that bag searches would reduce the
perceived threat.58
July 27, 2004), and order entered by 2004 WL 1683166 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
47 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345.
48 Id. at *10.
49 id.
50 Id. at *7.
"' Id. at *9.
52 id.
53 Id.
' No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004), amended by
2004 WL 1663600 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004), and order entered by 2004 WL 1683166
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
51 Id. at *89; see also Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of
September 11, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327 (2005) (detailing the author's involvement in
the Stauber litigation as the associate legal director of the NYCLU).
56 The City suggested that bag searches were more analogous to magnetometer searches at
the airport than to pat-down searches. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *30.
57 Id.
58 Id. at *31. The order issued by Judge Robert Sweet enjoined bag searches "without the
showing of both the probability of a threat to public safety and a determination that blanket
searches could reduce that threat." Stauber, 2004 WL 1683166, at * 1. The NYCLU proposed
that the order require "specific" information regarding a threat to public safety before the city
could conduct bag searches. Stauber, 2004 WL 1663600, at *1. The City proposed the use
of the modifer "credible" in the order. Id. Instead, Judge Sweet imposed a probable cause
standard. Id.
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While the Massachusetts and New York courts seemingly reached different con-
clusions, the Stauber court was careful to distinguish its opinion.59 It acknowledged
that "[a] bag search in the context of the exercise of constitutionally protected speech
calls for a different analysis." This distinction is significant. Of the six recently de-
cided special needs cases, the two cases that resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts dealt with
searches at demonstrations.6 The four remaining cases involved searches conducted
as part of transit security programs.62
III. MACWADE V. KELLY
The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
New York City's container inspection program fits squarely within the special needs
exception to the Fourth Amendment.63 As a threshold matter, both courts found that
the program does not advance a more general interest in law enforcement because
searches are voluntary and aimed only at discovering explosives. 6 Having estab-
lished that the program serves the special need of preventing a terrorist attack on the
subway, both courts determined that the program is reasonable because it serves a
-paramount government interest, is sufficiently effective, and narrowly tailored.65
In doing so, both courts heavily credited the testimony of three defense expert
witnesses: David Cohen, NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence; Michael
Sheehan, NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism; and Richard Clarke,
former Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group on the National Security
Council. 66 Their expert testimony established that once terrorists marshal their re-
sources, they want a target that will ensure a certainty of success. 67 The witnesses
9 Id. The District Court specifically referred to "[tihe circumstances of the Madrid [train]
bombings." Id.
6 Id. In Stauber, bag searches burdened demonstrators' First Amendment rights by barring
those that refused consent from attending protests. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *29-31.
61 See supra note 46.
62 See supra note 46.
63 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260,275 (2d Cir. 2006); MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ.
6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
MacWade, 460 F.3d at 270; MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17.
65 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 271-75; MacWade, 2005 WL 3338753, at *17-20.
66 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 265-67; MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *10-12. All three
defense experts have extensive counter-terrorism experience: Commissioner Cohen served
in the CIA's analysis and operations divisions for thirty-five years; Commissioner Sheehan
garnered nearly thirty years of counter-terrorism experience as a member of Army Special
Forces, Deputy Assistant Secretary at the State Department, and Assistant Secretary General
of the United Nations; and Mr. Clarke served as a senior White House Advisor to Presidents
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush on issues of intelligence and
counter-terrorism. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *10-11.
67 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 266-67.
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maintained that terrorists prefer predictability and that random searches add unpre-
dictability to the planning and implementation of an attack, which increases the risk
of failure and ultimately encourages terrorists "to choose ... an easier target.
68
A. The Gravity of the Public Concern
The District Court acknowledged that preventing a terrorist attack "is a govern-
mental interest of the very highest order."'69 In light of several failed plots to bomb
the City's system70 and increasingly frequent attacks on foreign transit systems,7' New
York City's interest in securing its subway is substantial.72 Moreover, the absence
of a specific threat directed at the City's subway does not undermine the reasonable-
ness of its container inspection program.73 As the American-Arab court argued:
[T]here is... no reason to believe that specific information is
necessarily, or even frequently, available before a terrorist attack,
so its absence cannot be taken to indicate that the facilities are
68 Id. The element of randomness is also being discussed in other search contexts. See Eric
Lipton, Significant Changes in Air Passenger Screening Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 2005,
at A28; see also United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612,618 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
random selection of airline passengers for additional screening procedures furthers the goal of
deterring and detecting terrorism aimed at commercial aviation); United States v. Green, 293
F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that random searches "provide[] a gauntlet, random
as it is, that persons bent on mischief must traverse"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 966 (2002).
69 MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *17; see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 449 (1990) (finding that the State had "a grave and legitimate" interest in preventing
drunk-driving through sobriety checkpoints); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656,674 (1989) (finding reasonable a U.S. Customs Service employee drug-screening
policy "[i]n light of the extraordinary safety and national security" concerns involved (em-
phasis added)); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (noting "the
substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent
checkpoints" (emphasis added)); Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying
on Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, in which "the government's interests were extremely weighty"
(emphasis added)); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) ("When the
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property .... the
danger alone meets the test of reasonableness." (citation omitted)).
70 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
72 Arguably, the nature of the threat to New York City's subway system would even satisfy
the Stauber court. See supra note 58.
71 Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,417 n.7 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("All
of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous
chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individual-
ized suspicion."), with Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11 th Cir. 2004) ("While
the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, we cannot use it as the basis for restricting the scope
of the Fourth Amendment's protections in any large gathering of people.").
1293
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
not likely targets. With respect to airport security measures, the
absence of specific threat information about a particular flight or
even a particular airport does not vitiate either the authority or
the wisdom of conducting security screenings generally for all
flights.74
Judge O'Toole' s reasoning is not revolutionary. Indeed, the Supreme Court first
articulated this argument in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, when
it determined that a nationwide drug problem justified drug testing of Customs em-
ployees with no personal history of drug abuse.75 The Court stated, "It is sufficient
that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive
societal problem from spreading to the particular context. ' 76 More recently, in Board
of Education v. Earls, the Court again employed this argument when it held that a
school district need not await a "particularized or pervasive drug problem before...
conduct[ing] suspicionless drug testing. 77
Similarly, the government should not await an immediate threat to a particular
mode of transportation before adopting a reasonable transit security program. New
York City's approach is instructive. City officials did not act hastily or haphazardly
in the immediate aftermath of September 11.78 Nor did they await a specific threat
to the City's subway. Instead, the NYPD implemented the container inspection pro-
gram after the London Underground attacks, because "(i) '[those attacks] reaffirmed
the shift to transportation systems as targets;' (ii) 'they were carried out by individ-
uals... with links to similar groups operating in New York;' and (iii) 'they were
carried out notwithstanding a substantial security system which includes extensive
video surveillance. ,,79
B. The Degree to Which the Intrusion Advances the Public Interest
The NYCLU maintained that the City's container inspection program is not a
meaningful deterrent because searches are not conducted at most subway entrances
7' American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-
11652-GAO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345, at *5-6 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
75 489 U.S. 656 (1989); see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451
(1990) (relying on nationwide drunk-driving problem in upholding Michigan's use of sobri-
ety checkpoints).
76 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3.
77 536 U.S. 822, 835-36 (2002).
78 The City's restraint contradicts assertions that the container inspection program is part
of a larger movement of city officials to drastically expand police powers under the guise of
combating terrorism.
" MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 2005) (citations omitted).
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and because they are consensual 8°-seemingly taking the incongruous position that
the program would be more effective if it were more intrusive.8 ' Of course, the con-
tainer inspection program would be more effective if passengers were not provided
advance notice or if police searched all passengers at every subway station.82 The
program might also be more effective if police targeted passengers who fit a partic-
ular terrorist profile.83 Requiring maximum effectiveness, 84 however, would surely
lead to less narrowly tailored counter-terrorism programs. The city's decision, then,
to employ flexible and shifting security checkpoints remains reasonable even if other
more intrusive methods would prove more effective.85
80 Complaint, supra note 12, at 2. At trial, the NYCLU offered the testimony of two experts
to support this argument: Gene Russianoff, a staff attorney for the New York Public Interest
Research Group's Straphangers Campaign, and Charles Pena, a consultant working with the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *8-9.
Russianoff argued that "a person wishing to [could] easily evade the NYPD checkpoints and
enter the [subway] system at entrances without checkpoints." Id. at *8 (citation omitted). Addi-
tionally, Pena testified that the deterrent effect of the program was "close to zero" because pas-
sengers could walk away from an inspection. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). However, the District
Court concluded, as a matter of fact, that the defense experts were more credible, persuasive,
and reasonable in their analysis and conclusions. Id.
8 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676 n.4 ("[Plaintiffs'] objection is based on those features of
the [government's] program.., that contribute significantly to diminish the program's intrusion
on privacy. Thus, under [plaintiffs'] view, 'the testing program would be more likely to be con-
stitutional if it were more pervasive and more invasive of privacy."' (internal citations omitted)).
82 Yet, a program with a 100% inspection rate would undoubtedly paralyze the subway
system. For example, "more than 1,500 people per minute would have to be screened [at New
York's Penn Station] to maintain current levels of mobility and access." The London Attacks:
Training to Respond in a Mass Transit Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of the H. Comm. of Homeland Security,
109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Robert D. Jamison, Deputy Administrator, Federal Transit
Administration), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
109_househearings&docid=f:28022.pdf.
83 The constitutionality of racial profiling in the context of counter-terrorism programs is
beyond the scope of this Note. See Deborah A. Ramirez et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a
Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1195 (2003) (arguing that racial profiling
is ineffective); Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus, Fourth Amendment Forum, THE
CHAMPION, Dec. 2005, at 54, 54-57 (debating whether random searches of subway passen-
gers or profiling is less offensive to the Fourth Amendment).
'4 In United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit stated that
there must be "a minimum of intrusiveness coupled with maximal effectiveness so that the
searches 'bear a close and substantial relationship' to the government's 'special needs."' Id. at
186. This restatement of the special needs analysis does not, as the NYCLU suggests, require
that suspicionless searches be maximally effective to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
See Mollica v. Volker, 229 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he effectiveness inquiry involves
only the question whether the [search] is a 'reasonable method of deterring the prohibited
conduct;' the test does not require that the [search] be 'the most effective measure."' (quoting
Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1996))).
85 "Common sense tells us that 'more is better than some, some is better than none, none
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In the absence of a strict effectiveness requirement, the NYCLU contended that
suspicionless search programs must at least have a "measurable deterrent effect.,
86
But, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to scrutinize the effectiveness of
special needs searches. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court
upheld a sobriety checkpoint program where only 1.6% of drivers stopped were ar-
rested for alcohol impairment.87 In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court up-
held a border patrol program where only 0.12% of vehicles stopped contained illegal
aliens. 88 And in Earls, the Court upheld a school district's random drug-testing of
students involved in extra-curricular activities without citing any evidence of effective-
ness.89 A methodical review of effectiveness is even less practical in the context of
counter-terrorism programs.' Accordingly, courts should rely on sound reasoning,
rather than quantifiable data (which is usually unavailable anyway), to evaluate transit
security checkpoints.9"
Furthermore, courts ought not second-guess the judgment of law enforcement
and other public officials. In Sitz, the Supreme Court explained that the effectiveness
prong of the special needs doctrine:
was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to
the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative
law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a
serious public danger. Experts in police science might disagree
over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers
is preferrable [sic] as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique un-
derstanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources,
including a finite number of police officers.92
helps [terrorists].'... '[A]s long as there is some checking, there is going to be somewhat of
a deterrence. The more checking, the more deterrence."' MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *12
n.21 (citations omitted).
86 Id. at *13; see also MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 2006).
87 496 U.S. 444, 448-49, 454-55 (1990).
88 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
89 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-38 (2002).
9 Contra Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870,
at *31 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004) (finding that the City did not provide any information to
suggest that its bag search policy would address the kinds of threats that the NYPD faced at
demonstrations), amended by 2004 WL 1663600 (S.D.N.Y. July 27,2004), and order entered
by 2004 WL 1683166 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004).
9' Cf Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,675 n.3 (1989) ("When
the Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low incidence of such
conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme for implementing this interest, is more
logically viewed as a hallmark of success.").
92 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
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Surely there may be other reasonable means of securing New York City's subway
system, but judges are not equipped to make such esoteric decisions. 93 As made clear
in Sitz, courts should defer to those with expertise in law enforcement (in MacWade,
the judgment of Commissioners Cohen and Sheehan, with a combined seventy years
of counter-terrorism experience) 94 and those whom the public can hold "politically
accountable" (in MacWade, the Mayor of New York, who was re-elected after im-
plementing the container inspection program)95 when determining whether counter-
terrorism programs effectively deter an attack.
C. The Severity of the Interference with Individual Liberty
In November 2005, the NYPD implemented a pilot project to determine the
feasibility of using explosive detection technology in subway inspections.96 The
experimental technology would allow police to test for the presence of chemicals like
ammonium nitrate or hydrogen peroxide (ingredients used in the London bombs) with
hand-held mechanized devices.97 Only after an exterior sweep resulted in a positive
identification would passengers be required to open their bags for a visual inspection.98
The District Court reopened the record in MacWade to consider whether this pilot
project altered its legal analysis.99 It determined that the technology did not undermine
the reasonableness of visual inspections because it was not capable of detecting all
types of explosive material."°°
Nevertheless, the existence of less intrusive means does not render otherwise
permissible searches unconstitutional. In Earls, the Supreme Court stated, "[R]eason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least intrusive
means, because '[t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
9' Commissioner Sheehan explained that the development of counter-terrorism strategies
is "as much art as it is science." Sewell Chan, Testimony Completed in Suit over Searches
in Subways, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at B3.
9 MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at *10-11
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005).
" On November 8,2005, Michael R. Bloomberg was re-elected Mayor of New York by
a historic 20-point margin of victory. Patrick D. Healy, Bloomberg Cruises to Re-Election
Victory; Corzine Is Winner in Costly New Jersey Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al.
96 Al Baker & Sewell Chan, New Devices Will Search for Explosives in Subways, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at B3.
97 id.
98 Id.
99 MacWade, 2005 WL 3338573, at *7-8.
100 Id. at *7 ("[T]he equipment 'may... be effective in detecting some explosives, but not
others,' and it 'cannot replace visual inspections... because given its present technological
limitations, visual inspections may be the only means for detecting a particular type of explo-
sive."' (citations omitted)); id. at *8. ("'The use of the explosive detection technology by the
NYPD is experimental, not operational.' The NYPD has purchased relatively few explosive
detection devices and is employing them in a limited fashion." (citation omitted)).
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could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure
powers."" 0' As even the NYCLU acknowledges, narrow tailoring can conversely
correlate to less effective transit security programs.l0 2 In achieving the delicate bal-
ance, then, between intrusiveness and effectiveness, the NYPD need not replace visual
inspections with the less intrusive use of explosive detection canines,' 3 magnetome-
ters,104 or even searches based on individualized suspicion.1
0 5
IV. A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO TRANSIT SECURITY
Americans routinely submit to intrusive searches of their person and luggage as
a condition of air travel. But Justice Souter, dissenting in United States v. Drayton,
observed that "[tihe commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been
justified for ground transportation.... and no such conditions have been placed on
passengers getting on trains or buses."'" Steven Shapiro, national legal director of the
ACLU, recently suggested that this distinction between air and ground travel "could
be as important as the court's decision.' 0 7 Indeed, critics of New York City's con-
tainer inspection program are hopeful that Justice Souter's dissenting opinion signals
an emerging trend, where the legal analysis employed could depend on the mode of
transportation at issue.
At the core of the NYCLU's case in MacWade is the supposition that subways
are inherently different from airplanes. Instead, the NYCLU claims that the subway
101 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12 (1976)); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 663 (1995) ("We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive'
search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." (citation omitted));
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,629 n.9 (1989) ("We have repeatedly
stated... that '[t]he reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily
or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." (citation omitted)).
102 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
103 "Canine performance has.., been shown to 'fall off exponentially' ... because of
distractions like gusts of air, noise, food, and people-all realities, of course, of mass transit."
Amanda Schaffer, Sorry, Dogs Don't Do Subways, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.slate
.com/id/2134394.
104 Magnetometers do not detect plastic or chemical explosives. What's Next in Science
& Technology, Airport Security Machines Will Sniff Terrorists Out, Literally, http://www
.whatsnextnetwork.com/technology/index.php/2005/05/15 (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
105 Police can always stop subway passengers if they have reasonable suspicion that they
are involved in criminal activity, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), but recent attacks
demonstrate that terrorists are sophisticated enough to avoid attracting undue attention with
their appearance or demeanor. See Image of Bomber's Deadly Journey, BBC NEWS, July 17,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/4689739.stm (reporting on a video showing that
while four London bombers each carried bags when they entered the subway, none acted in
a suspicious manner).
106 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
107 Jan Crawford Greenburg, Justices Strengthen Police Search Power, CHI. TRIB., June
18, 2002, at N I.
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system is "a direct, physical extension" of the city's sidewalks, and that like pedes-
trians on the street, subway passengers have an undiminished expectation of privacy
in their bags.1 18
Although the Second Circuit agreed that subway passengers enjoy a full privacy
expectation, the court held that New York City's container inspection program is
reasonable because it only minimally intrudes upon privacy interests.' °9 The nature
of passengers' privacy interests, then, did not tip the balance against the government.
Still, the Second Circuit's nomenclature is not of "little analytical significance.""
°
It indicates that the court does in fact differentiate between airplane and subway
passengers, which could be decisive in future special needs cases.
Whether an expectation of privacy exists for Fourth Amendment purposes
requires a two-pronged analysis: (1) "whether the individual, by his conduct, has ex-
hibited an actual expectation of privacy;""' and (2) "whether the individual's ex-
pectation of privacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.""' 12
Certainly, a subway passenger carrying a closed, opaque bag on her person has mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy. Yet, contrary to the Second Circuit's con-
clusion in MacWade, that expectation is not objectively reasonable given the routine
nature of subway searches and the severity of the threat to public safety and the
nation's transportation infrastructure.
Law enforcement and security personnel perform consensual searches daily at
airports, museums, stadiums, federal buildings, and courthouses across the country.13
Nowhere are these searches more commonplace than New York City, were residents
are acutely aware of the danger posed by terrorism. Approximately 20,000 subway
passengers voluntarily submitted to bag searches in just the first week of the City's
container inspection program.' '4 Since then, hundreds of thousands more have
consented to subway searches, suggesting public acceptance of limited privacy re-
ductions in exchange for enhanced security."'
108 Plaintiff s Post-Trial Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Post-Trial Memorandum].
' 9 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
" United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) ("It has been suggested
that those who seek to travel on a common carrier have a lower 'expectation of privacy'
regarding their person and the bags they carry .... Such a suggestion has little analytical
significance.
"' Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
112 Id.
13 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) ("[W]here the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches... may rank as 'reasonable'-for example,
searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official buildings.");
accord City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 274 (2000).
"4 Patrick McGeehan, A Week of Random Backpack Searches Yields Little Drama, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at B 1.
"' Alan Feuer, Appeals Court Upholds Random Police Searches of Passengers' Bags on
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Over thirty years ago, the Second Circuit recognized this trade-off as reasonable
when it concluded that,
[If] the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and mil-
lions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up
of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonable-
ness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the pur-
pose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable
scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not
to travel by air." 6
Like airplanes, subway systems accord terrorists the opportunity to destroy "hundreds
[perhaps thousands] of human lives and millions of dollars of property."' 17 And, like
the wave of hijackings that precipitated airport searches in the 1960s," 8 the suc-
cession of bombings on foreign transit systems evinces a need for a new approach
to transit security.' 9
While commercial aviation and public transit demand unique security prog-
rams, 20 "the fundamental [legal] issues should not be substantially affected by the
Subways, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, at B5.
16 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
"7 Id. Terrorist attacks on transit systems typically produce higher fatalities than other
terrorist attacks. Keeping America's Mass Transportation System Safe: Is the Law Adequate?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (statement of Brian
Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation Security Center), available at http://
judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=l 1238&witid=3276 [hereinafter Jenkins Statement].
For example, analysis of approximately 1,000 terrorist attacks on transit systems revealed
that two-thirds of these attacks clearly were intended to kill passengers, seventy-four percent
of the fatal attacks involved multiple fatalities, and twenty-eight percent involved ten or more
fatalities. Id. Beyond the human toll, transit attacks can have devastating economic conse-
quences. For example, the New York City Comptroller estimated that a three-day transit strike
in December 2005 cost the city approximately $1 billion. Richard Prez-Pefia, Businesses
Tally Losses from Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at B6. If, instead, an attack disabled a
portion of the system for several weeks or months, the costs would be enormous.
"' See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803-06 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing the
need to deter those "for whom death holds no fear and little consequence," from using weapons
to hijack airplanes and transform them into "weapon[s] of mass destruction").
"9 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
20 Approximately 60,000 security personnel inspect 2 million daily airplane passengers.
Jenkins Statement, supra note 117, at 4. A comparable screening system for the 26 million
daily transit passengers "would require hundreds of thousands of screeners and ... cost tens
of billions of dollars." Id. Further, the use of x-ray machines, magnetometers, and explosive
detection canines, which are used extensively in airport terminals, cannot be easily replicated
in subway stations. Id.; see also supra notes 103-04.
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mode of transportation involved."'' The principle purpose of security in both airports
and subways is to deter a terrorist attack.'2 To do so, both security programs require
passengers to submit to suspicionless searches.123 These searches are reasonable in
part because the need to deter an attack reduces airplane and subway passengers'
privacy interests.
Furthermore, airport terminals are far more similar to subway stations than city
sidewalks. Subway passengers must pay a fee, enter the system through a turnstile,
and board subway cars traveling across subway tracks operated and maintained by the
city. Subway passengers also do not have the same freedom of movement as pedes-
trians on the sidewalk. Applying consistent constitutional standards to modes of
public transport makes clearer the distinction between subways and sidewalks and
ensures that suspicionless search policies cannot be easily extended to pedestrians
on the street.
CONCLUSION
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) recently unveiled the high-
tech future of transit security in New York City.24 The centerpiece of the MTA's
transit security plan is a sizeable network of 1,000 video cameras that can zoom, pivot,
and rotate to capture distances up to 300 feet. 25 The MTA will also deploy 3,000
motion sensors, and for the first time, enable cell phone service in 277 underground
12 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-
11652-GAO, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345, at *6 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
122 Compare MacWade v. Kelly, No.05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (affirming that the purpose of the container inspection program "is
primarily deterrent"), with United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,908 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The es-
sential purpose of [airport security] is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those
who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board at all.").
123 Airplane and subway passengers regularly consent to suspicionless searches as a con-
dition of traveling on each mode of transportation. The NYCLU argues that consent to subway
searches is actually not voluntary because the subway is the primary source of transportation
for many New Yorkers. Post-Trial Memorandum, supra note 108, at *2. But subway passen-
gers, like airline passengers, have a choice in their transportation. Although the alternatives
are not attractive, there is no constitutional right to convenient travel. Additionally, subway
passengers may opt not to carry bags large enough to trigger an inspection.
124 Sewell Chan, M. T.A. to Keep Electronic Eye on the Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,2005,
at Al. The MTA awarded Lockheed Martin a three-year, $212 million contract to implement
the transit security plan. Id. The mayor urged the MTA to "move forward immediately with
installing more cameras in subway stations, as they are an important deterrent and will be an
invaluable investigative tool for the N.Y.P.D." Id.
'25 Id. The executive director of the NYCLU cautioned that, "[t]here are questions about
both the value and the privacy implications of massive video surveillance in subways." Id. The
constitutionality of video surveillance, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. See Marc
Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth
Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2004).
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stations. 126 This new technology should allow transit workers to detect, in real-time,
passengers entering unauthorized areas or unattended bags left on station platforms. 1
27
Though the MTA's transit security plan is unlikely to soon replace the container
inspection program, 12 technological advances could eventually enable New York
City to secure the subway without performing visual searches of passengers' bags.
In the meantime, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) became
the second transit system in the United States to implement a suspicionless search
policy when it began searching Boston subway passengers in October 2006.129 Pub-
lic officials in cities including Washington, D.C., and San Francisco are also con-
templating transit security proposals modeled after New York City's container
inspection program. 
130
These programs are all a legitimate and necessary response to a terrorist strata-
gem directed at transit systems. A successful attack on a transit system in the United
States could result in mass casualties, disable a city's system, disrupt commerce, and
demoralize the entire nation. Moreover, the potential for a catastrophic attack in-
volving nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons alarmingly is not far-
fetched.' 3' In light of these extreme risks, the minimal intrusion occasioned by
suspicionless subway searches is reasonable.
126 Chan, supra note 124. The MTA abandoned its objections to cell phone service, con-
cluding that "the benefits of enabling 911 and other calls during emergencies outweighed...
the risk of a phone-detonated bomb." Id. Cell phone service will still not be available on
moving trains. Id.
127 Id.
128 The United Kingdom began using security cameras in the 1990s. Jeffrey Rosen, The
Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an Age of Terror, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 607,
609 (2004). Today there are over 4.2 million cameras throughout the country and the average
British citizen is supposedly photographed 300 times a day. Id. Yet, ubiquitous security
cameras did not deter or detect the attack on London's transit system. Id.
129 Mac Daniel, T's Searches Turn up Only False Alarms but Officials Say Antiterror Effort
Is a Deterrent, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2007, at Al.
130 Chan & Fahim, supra note 13. Additionally, Richard Clarke recently advised legislators
from thirty-six states on specific measures they could take to enhance homeland security, in-
cluding instituting random passenger searches on any subway or light rail system. Larry
Neumeister, Clarke Urges More Subway Searches, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/07/AR2005110700294.html.
131 According to the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte:
Although an attack using conventional explosives continues to be the
most probable scenario, al-Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to
attack the United States .... In fact, intelligence reporting indicates
that nearly 40 terrorist organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used,
possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear agents or weapons.
World Wide Threat: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence).
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Admittedly, the threat to public safety could easily be exploited to excuse un-
necessary intrusions upon civil liberties. 132 As the late Chief Justice Rehnquist cau-
tioned in his last book, "[i]t is all too easy to slide from a case of genuine military
necessity.., to one where the threat is not critical and the power either dubious or
nonexistent."'' 33 Indeed, our nation's history intimates that civil liberties often suffer
from the expansion of executive power in wartime. 34 And that possibility is even
greater when the conflict, like this one, has no foreseeable end. 
135
Nevertheless, in the war on terror, some adjustments of the subtle balance between
liberty and security are appropriate. Fortunately, the Constitution, and in this case, the
Fourth Amendment, are nimble enough to accommodate such a balancing of interests.
Moreover, vigilance by the courts, the legislature, and the public will surely curb any
potential imbalance. Indeed, in MacWade, the District Court acknowledged that the
NYCLU' s complaint fulfilled an important oversight function by ensuring that New
York City's container inspection program received adequate scrutiny.'36
132 See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496,502 (2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., concurring)
("It is all too easy to permit encroachments upon personal liberty whenever there surfaces 'a
barbarism hidden behind the superficial amenities of life.' Airplane hijacking is not the only
'barbarism' which may result in calls for new means of investigation and detection 'applied
to everyone."'); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1972) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring) ("If the danger to the public posed by the current wave of [airplane] hijackings
were held to constitute adequate ground for such a broad expansion of police power, the sharp
increase in the rate of serious crimes in our major cities could equally be used to justify similar
searches of persons or homes in high crime areas based solely upon the 'trained intuition' of
the police."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
"I WuiAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BuT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224
(1998).
134 See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV.
663, 667-70 (2004) (summarizing the historic use of executive power during times of war).
"' The Supreme Court acknowledged this problem of open-endedness in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) ("If the Government does not consider this unconven-
tional war won for two generations ... Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his life.").
136 MacWade v. Kelly, No.05 Civ. 6921 (RMB/FM), 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 2005).
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